AW! Epistles
From Karl 5
Abstract
Sunday, 26 June 2005
Karl: I have just noticed that you included the aside I made in my earlier about resisting slavery in the webpages, so I thought that I should respond you your remarks. In response to your claim that many scientists are not in a position to be defiant, especially when they have children and have no control over their means of production, I said:
“Everyone is in a position to be defiant. Slavery is as much a product of people allowing themselves to be enslaved, as it is the product of people capturing other people and putting them in chains. The slave masters can torture and starve the slaves, but they cannot make them pick up the tools and do the work. It might sound harsh, but every time that someone chooses slavery over death then they propagate slavery because they make it work. And this is even especially relevant when one has children. I owe it to my children to show them how to live life well, being free and happy, whilst being compassionate to others, not so they copy me, but so they see that it is possible. It would be better for me and my children to die, rather than live as slaves. One has a duty to humanity to be as free and happy as one can be. After all, as Socrates observed, for us agnostics, we do not know that death is good or bad, but we do know that to live life against our nature is bad for us.”
To which you replied:
“It is very romantic, but I do not think you have the right to sacrifice even your own children for your theories, though your own life is yours to dispose of as you wish. Your children might easily not be as willing as you are to give up their lives, even though they are not free.”
Putting aside the dismissiveness of this remark, I did not actually say that I would sacrifice my children for my theories—that is something that you put into my mouth, so to speak, rather than taking the trouble to address the deeper question about individual moral responsibility that I was making. What I said was that it would be better for me and my children to die rather than live as slaves. That does not even imply that I would sacrifice them out of moral principle. It merely says that they would be better off being dead than being put to work as slaves. At no point did I even suggest that I would kill them or force them to do anything. I actually said that I would simply offer them an example through my own actions. I even said that I didn’t expect them to copy me—just so they know that they have a choice. What I was saying that one had a moral responsibility not to work for slavers. How one goes about resisting slavers is a matter of one’s own decision. All I said is that one should not pick up the tools and do the work. I did not suggest any act of violence or suicide. If other human beings choose to kill you for refusing to work for them then that is an act of monstrousness that one should be as defiant against as one possibly can. To make myself clear, if I were in that awful situation, I would do all that I could to escape with my children. If that failed then I would refuse to work. Even if that meant death for me and my children. But I did not say that I would even stop my children from working. I just would not do so myself and show them that they did not have to either.
“They might think so long as they are alive there is the chance of changing things, and plenty of people have been right about that.”
Historically, even though there have been a few slave revolts, most “slaves” were “freed” by outside conquerors defeating their “masters”, most of these were then enslaved by their new “masters”. I understand that many people adopt slavery, whilst waiting for things to change, but the reality is that, in the large part, this is how slavery works. It terrorises human beings into capitulating and then habitualises the captive into this way of life—in the hope of liberty in the future. In the majority of cases, history shows us that most people, once enslaved, die as slaves, leaving their children and grandchildren to die as slaves. Slavery feeds off human fear, desperation, and cowardice.
“I, for example, would sooner see the slave owners enslaved than to see them notionally deprived of an income by giving away my own life so easily, while being unsure that all of my fellow slaves would do the same thing to secure a Pyrrhic victory.”
Well that is your choice. My point is that you should take responsibility for it. I made the comment about slavery in response to your claim that many scientists do not have a choice. My point is that you are simply wrong about this. Everyone has a choice. Of course you do not have to choose as I do. My point is that you have a choice and how you excercise that choice is your responsibility.
“Many people facing up to the Romans at the time of Christ were willing to die rather than be enslaved. The defenders of Masada were the last of them, but they had fought first. The evidence is that Christ was among those fighting, and that is why he was crucified.”
And these people are remembered as having died in a noble struggle against brutal oppressors. They were an example—it is a shame that they were not more inspiring. Many people died during the Second World War in resistence against the Nazis. Whilst resistence can take many forms, if the Nazis had not been resisted then they would not have been defeated. If everyone had merely waited change to come then we would be living under the shadow of the Third Reich today. All the victims of the concentration camps would have been worked to death or murdered if they had not been liberated by the allied armies. Europe and Russia would have been conquered by the German army, unless people had resisted them, dying in their millions doing so, and ultimately the entire world would have been dominated by the Nazis. Many people sacrificed their lives for the freedom of others from the Nazis—often losing loved ones in the process—whilst others waited to be liberated, some as collaborators, others as people who were understandably too frightened or shocked to resist. But the people who resisted were not romantics, sacrificing others for their theories—they were decent, ordinary people who were forced to make stark moral choices against oppressors. And the people who did not resist were opportunists, cowards, or both.
“People might be in a position to be defiant, but being defiant at a time chosen by your masters might ensure your defeat.”
Of course one can act intelligently and bide one’s time—but this is a matter of strategy, not a question of moral responsibility. However, there is a distinction between biding one’s time, in order to maximise one’s chances of success, and merely waiting for someone else to rescue one—risking their lives in the process—or for salvation to fall from above.
“And it still assumes that you are actually aware that something can be done—that the situation has possibilities of salvation. My point about scientists being politically naïve is that the politically naïve do not even realise what is going on, and so cannot chose a different direction.”
Whilst this may well be true of scientists in the past, it is a very poor excuse for scientists today. There is a difference between political naivety and indifference. Which is why I said
“Of course scientists cannot know all the consequences of their work and therefore cannot be held responsible for unforeseeable consequences. But they do need to be responsible in the sense that they must follow their work and the uses of their work into the wider world, publically joining the democratic fray about questions of how their work should be used and to what end.”
Your suggestion that some kind of scientitis union is an interesting one. But, however individual scientists choose to proceed, my key point is that they cannot divorce themselves from the same moral responsibilities that we all have—especially when it is a matter of historical fact that scientific work has been abused by manipulative industrialists and politicians. One does not need some special education to be aware of this historical fact—access to a television and a public library is sufficient to impart this awareness. Politically naïvety is not a good excuse. Not any more.
“It explains their behaviour, but I agree it is no excuse. There is still the problem of those who think they are doing right by helping to develop such weapons. The ones who sought to develop the A-bomb were doing what you advocated just now—they were determined they would not end up slaves of the Nazis or the Bushido. Perhaps they took your sacrifice further. They were willing to kill everyone in the world rather then accept tyranny. I object to them deciding for me what I should do with my life, so I am not excusing them, but simply wanting to understand them.”
Firstly, in my original comments about a moral duty to resist slavers, I said nothing about a moral duty to commit acts of violence or forcing others to choose as I do. Not even my own children. I was quite explicit about merely showing them that they had a choice. Please do not willfully misconstrue my position as being one that advocates violence and forcing my views on others—especially when you are putting my emails on the Internet. However, I do understand their choice to develop better weapons that the Nazis and Japanese, as part of their participation in the war. Perhaps they were justified in making this choice. It is arguable that the Nazis could not have been defeated through passive resistance. Perhaps violence was necessary in this case. If that is true then I accept that one needs to be better at it than one’s opposition in order to defeat one’s opposition. Basic military strategy: keep hitting the enemy harder than they hit you and they will collapse before you do. It was also quite possible that the Germans were building the A-Bomb—although, it seems that, from the vantage of historical hindsight that this belief was more based on German propaganda and misinformation than reality. I don’t know. My point is simply that the scientists who worked on the A-Bomb made a moral choice to make this weapon. Perhaps it was the right one. That is another question. My point is that they cannot evade moral responsibility for that choice, right or wrong (or somewhere in between). Moreover, it was well known before the A-Bomb was finished that Germany was collapsing and was actually defeated before the first bomb was tested. It was also pretty clear that Japan was about to be defeated too—it was only a matter of time—and this information was widely published in newspapers at that time. The scientists have a moral responsability for finishing the A-Bomb and for the further development of the plutonium bomb—including aiding its mass production. It was pretty obvious that the plutonium bomb was to be developed as a possible weapon against the Soviets. Furthermore, even if those scientists were innocent of such an awareness, today’s scientists, with the lessons of history, can see how once something is invented it generally cannot be uninvented (perhaps nuclear weapons are the only inventions that can un-invent themselves!) and one’s enemy has a nasty habit of acquiring one’s technologies. Pandora’s Box is opened… The lessons of the history of the atomic bomb are actually a lession for scientists about how the products of good intentions can be so easily perverted in the real world. Scientists have no excuse for ignoring these lessons. Of course, many scientists are against the development of such weapons—and others might have good reasons for working on the development of weapons—such is the nature of moral dilemas and reasoning—but my point is that scientists should be morally responsible for their work and when they evade that responsibility then they are being irresponsible. One has a duty to act out of knowledge and in regard for the truth, especially as a scientist, so to fail to make an effort to learn how politics works and how science is used in the real world is an act of the most profound ignorance. Ignorance is not an excuse—it is a choice.
I cannot understand why for a moment you should accuse me of wilfully misconstruing anything. What could be the purpose of any such wilful misconstruing? You have been fond of accusing me of misconstruing various things, but why you should now decide it is wilful defeats me. I am not even sure that I can fairly be accused of misconstruing what you said. Rather what you said could most reasonably be construed the way that I construed it. What you said was:
“It would be better for me and my children to die, rather than live as slaves. One has a duty to humanity to be as free and happy as one can be. After all, as Socrates observed, for us agnostics, we do not know that death is good or bad, but we do know that to live life against our nature is bad for us.”
I am quite ready to accept that you have overstated this or badly stated it, but I have not misconstrued it, for, if it is better to die rather than live as slaves and Socrates is cited to the effect that we should not live a life that is against our Nature, the conclusion must be that, given the fact of slavery we should die, and death does not happen of its own accord simply because life is not as we would wish it, but it has to be induced in the manner normally described as killing.
Given that in the preceding sentence I said:
“I owe it to my children to show them how to live life well, being free and happy, whilst being compassionate to others, not so they copy me, but so they see that it is possible.”
It seems to me to be quite clear that I had no intention of forcing them to do anything, let alone sacrifice them or kill them. Or anyone else for that matter. It seems to be quite a leap from saying that it would be better for me and my children to be dead than live as slaves, that I was suggesting that me and my children should be killed. I did not say anything of the kind and it seemed to me that you had to willfully make that leap in order to interpret me in that way. This struck is as a willful misconstrual of my position. As a consequence, it seemed to me that you were making a straw dog out of my position in order to avoid the deeper issue on inidvidual responsibility. If I said that it was better to die than be paralysed from the neck down it does not follow from that that I should kill anyone who so happened to be in that awful position. I would merely be saying how I felt about it, should it happen to me, so others need not feel guitly if they were to put me out of my misery. They would have my blessing and gratitute. But, if you just misunderstood me and you weren’t trying to pull a rhetorical fast one, then I apologise for saying that your misconstrual was willful.
But, “…given the fact of slavery we should die, and death does not happen of its own accord simply because life is not as we would wish it, but it has to be induced in the manner normally described as killing,”
neglects all the other forms of resistance (such as escape or non-co-operation) that can occur. Suicide is not the only form of resistance. And if it is the slavers that do the killing then that is their monstrosity at work and we would be better off (and they worse off) to be dead than at the disposal of such people. If every person thought as I did on this matter then slavery would be impossible. It would be a very unprofitable pretext for murder. But my point was that every time someone accepts “the fact” of their own slavery then they have perpetuated it by permitting it. Chains don’t make slaves (they only make people prisoners)—doing the work out of fear of death or punishment makes someone a slave.
I am glad that you deny that is what you meant because I did not think you could have meant it seriously. That is why I said it was romantic. People can get carried away on romantic notions like dying for your country which might seem noble to some but not to others. As for the subject we are speaking of, the moral responsibility of scientists, we are talking at cross purposes again, and again it is because you often speak of scientists as a bunch and I therefore defend them as a bunch. As a bunch, the vast majority of scientists are doing innocuous work that is prospectively either good or neutral. Such people have no reason to imagine that they have any moral responsibility for their work which is not in any way morally dubious. For those whose careers are spent on developing weaponry or GM foods, I agree with you. They have to be morally responsible for their work, but we have already gone into the fact that these people will justify their work in some way or another, and the justification is to them quite proper and not just an excuse. This arises because of what you consider worth giving your life for, if not those of your children—freedom! They are free to come to a conclusion that is neither yours nor mine but their own. I do think and hope that scientists could take a collective view on some of these matters, which is why I imagine some union-like organization, but then you would be calling them thought-policemen, so it is difficult to know which way you actually face.
I denied it because I did not say it. There is nothing romantic about being murdered by someone who is attempting to steal your labour. But I would rather be dead than let them have it. Cold dead hands do no work. But, of course, it would be better to escape them. Better still if they didn’t exist at all.
Our point of disagreement was whether or not people (including scientists) have a choice about whether or not to be defiant and withdraw their labour. If they feel that their work is good and society has misunderstood its value then let them stand up and say so. But the worst thing is for someone to hide behind “choicelessness” and evade their own responsibility. If they are going to fight for their freedom to pursue science as they see fit, rather than how society does, then let them stand up and say so. But let’s not have any pretence than a man has to work as a research scientist in order to make a crust. He could pick potatoes or work in a bar or on a building site. No-one has to clone embryos in order to make ends meet!
Now, I think that your idea of some collective union between scientists is a good one (as long as you don’t start saying that theologians can’t join because they are theologians—if they have an interest in the beneficial development of science and society then let them join—next you’ll be throwing out parapsychologists. Then the sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists. Then all the biologists and ecologists who hold in Gaia theory, vitalism, or morphogenic fields. And before you know it you end up with a bunch of positivistic chemists, physicists, and geneticists all grumbling about their pay and the lack of funding for research).
Have there been any really interesting efforts to set up such a collective or union? I guess that the Royal Society was kind of a historical example, but obviously a bit more of a gentlemans’ club than you had in mind.
I agree with you when you say:
“In a parallel world, Harvey could have the role of God in ours and God the role of Harvey. The question is why people began to believe in God and not Harvey.”
and whilst I think that in most part people just believe in God because they are brought up to do so (not really giving it all that much thought either, I suspect), as a cultural inheritance, and also that some people deliberately and cynically use people’s religious sensibilities and predispositions for their own advantage, for me the question of God’s existence is a meaningful question and I am open minded about it. My point about it being a logical possibility that there could be an absence of evidence about the existence of God and God could still exist. But, just to make the point clear, this does not suggest that God exists either. It does not follow from the possibility of God’s existence that God exists. My point is that there is no scientific basis for making a decision one way or another. There is also no logical basis either. It is one of those questions which cannot be answered by evidence or reason. That is why it is a matter of faith and belief. I am not comfortable with settling such matters on faith and therefore I am an agnostic. To give it a fully impartial expression, either the theist or atheist could be right. I simply do not know which one.
If God’s existence is a meaningful question, is it meaningful to ask whether Harvey exists? Or Puss in Boots? or Captain Marvel? Presumably, these are all meaningful questions, but are you as open minded about them as you are about the same question about God? Many people would say they are open-minded about the existence of God but would have no doubt at all that Puss in Boots and Captain Marvel are just fictional characters. Both Puss and Captain Marvel have miraculous abilities. God does too. All that differs is their scale, but there is nothing to stop anyone from imagining that Puss in Boots has God-like powers. Perhaps Captain Marvel has, but I never read the appropriate issue where he created a world. The point is that fictional powers can be anything we can imagine, including making worlds. I agree with you that in logic an almighty being could exist but never leave any sign that He did. So far as we are concerned, He does not exist, and we have no need to hypothesise that He does.
“Absence of evidence, contrary to what Christians always claim, is evidence of absence, as I said. I agree it is not proof of it, but it seems that theologians and philosophers merge together in their demand of atheists for proof that God does not exist, but need no proof that He does exist to continue to justify the belief he does—or might!”
I do not agree with you that the absence of evidence for the existence of God is itself evidence of the inexistence of God. However, when someone makes an existential claim (a positive claim or hypothesis) for the existence of God then the onus is upon them to provide evidence for that claim. However, it is practically impossible to falsify an existential claim (if one accepts that the absence of evidence is not evidence) without exploring all existence and therefore it is quite unreasonable for anyone to require a proof for the inexistence of God. One cannot discover or experience the inexistence of anything—to paraphrase Parmenides: it is a nonsense to postulate the being of nonbeing—and anyone requiring evidence for the inexistence of God from the atheist is simply being foolish. The burden of proof is on the shoulders of the person making the existential claim. Not the one who is being sceptical. My point is that, in the case of the existence or inexistence of God, the absence of evidence says nothing at all. When Christians use it for rhetorical purposes in support of their claim then they are trying to pull a fast one—on that I completely agree with you—but when the atheist holds that the absence of evidence supports their case then they are trying to pull a fast one too.
You are right that the burden of proof of the existence of God is on the Christians, although Christians always dishonestly like to pose it as a burden on the denier of God’s existence. Christians tell us that God is the most important thing there could be for all of us, yet for 2000 years they have never been able to prove that their God even exists. Therr is no compelling evidence that God exists even though His existence is supposedly of such supreme importantce to us. Moreover, God is almighty and, so we are told, loves us so much that He wants us all to be saved. All of these things that Christians know about God ought to have guaranteed that there is unequivocal evidence of God. There is no such evidence of any God meeting the Christian description when there ought to be indisputable evidence of Him. I repeat that this is evidence of God’s inexistence, though it is not proof of it.
“The basis of science is skepticism. The scientific skeptic will not accept anything without evidence.”
I agree. There is no scientific evidence for the existence of God. Not that I know of.
“The atheist and the scientific agnostic are practically the same. To be agnostic is not to know, and one does not know because there is no reason to know. If there is no reason to know then there is no reason to believe. The atheist has no reason to believe in God, and so does not.”
In most part I agree. I think that the only distinction that I really want to make is that I think that the atheist goes too far (after all, atheism states that God does not exist), but the agnostic when confronted with the question can only shrug the shoulders because any answer to the question is simply a guess. However, I agree that there is no reason or evidence to believe in God. It is simply a matter of faith and belief. I do not accept the premise of Pascal’s Wager either because, as you have said to someone else in one of the e-pistles, I’m sure that God could see through that. It is not true faith. On my account, Christians make fools of themselves when they try to persuade people to believe in God or have faith. It is pointless to argue that God exists because one must assume the answer in order to make the argument.
When there is no reason or evidence to believe something, then the rational being does not believe it.
“What is perverse is to have no reason to believe, and yet to believe nevertheless.”
Not really. It clearly is not scientific or reasonable to believe in the existence of God. But it is not perverse to simply belief something without reason or evidence. Arbitrary, yes. Perverse, no. What is perverse is to believe something that one has no reason to believe and then claim that one who does not believe it should present reasons for their disbelief. On that I would agree with you.
If it is unreasonable to believe without reason then it is perverse to do so. It is doubly perverse to demand reasons form your opponents when you have none yourself, though that is a most typical Christian apologetic ploy.
“Worse still is to persuade simple unanalytical people that believing without reason is a virtue called Faith.”
I agree. On my account, there is no reason to consider faith to be either a virtue or a vice.
“Talk about rhetorical tricks! This is disgusting, but it is the basis of the Christian scam.”
It certainly has been.
“…I am persuaded by the evidence I have seen that Christianity is monstrous as well as being unbelievable,”
I agree. I am also persuaded of this.
“…but I allow that fresh evidence I have not hitherto seen might persuade me differently.”
That is all I ask.
…No one has yet offered it to me, and so I remain unpersuaded that Christianity is historically wonderful, morally desirable and entirely right, and I do not expect to be persuaded of it.
Fair enough. The onus is on the Christian to so so.
“In the case of the Christian religion, we are speaking of an almighty being, perfectly good who wants to save people, yet cannot find a way to show unequivocally that all of this is true. If what you say is true, and this is too, then there should be no doubt involved. God can make it so, and we would know about it.”
On this kind of point I disagree with you. It always remains possible that God exists and human beings have radically misunderstood God due to human arrogance. Allow me to speculate for a moment. It strike me that it could well be possible that God created human beings with free will and let them make whatever they will of the world—that God created the world and played no further part. The idea was for human beings to create their own paradise on earth and to see that it is good for themselves through the effort and labour of making a good world. Perhaps this is what making man in God’s image really means. Perhaps, we participate in creation and all the evils of the world are actually our fault for being selfish, lazy, greedy, and basically awful to each other. We are not punished for our sins, we are punished by them. It strikes me that anyone who thinks that God will reward a good Christian in the afterlife may well be fundamentally mistaken. Perhaps the worst of all things is to believe in Christ and resurrection. Perhaps the message is that we have to be our own Christ and a Christ for each other. Maybe the only afterlife for us is our works and how we are remembered. But, this is just speculation. Like the Christian account, it is simply a story.
It is a story I like, and one that has far more moral value than the ones spread by the Christians. A God that made the world then went into eternal retirement is another God we can all accept. We ought not to need divine rewards and punishments to make us treat others as we would like to be treated by them, especially as the divine rewards and punishments do the opposite of what they are supposed to do, so that madmen can commit any enormity they choose because they have the delusion they are doing what God wants. Perhaps madmen like that can happen in any belief system, but there can be no excuses for millions of believers voting for them as they did in 1930s Germany when the Catholic party supported the Nazis and many Protestants voted for them, and more recently in the USA when millions of Christians voted for the man who had cynically murdered myriads of innocent Moslems and some of his own people out of pure corruption presented as a modern Christian crusade. US Christians know as much about the teachings of Christ as Qinghis Khan did, perhaps less because Qinghis had a lot of Nestorians in his court. I notice today that Halliburton, VP Cheney’s company, are to be given millions of dollars to run Guantanamo Bay!
“Now you will tell me that you ‘just do not know’how God might think,”
I assure that I don’t know how God might think.
…but again your unwillingness to reach any conclusions seem to me to be perverse.
I told you what I thought. I think that Jesus died on the cross. He was murdered and that was the end of him. I believe that all the talk of his resurrection and the whole of Christianity was based on a lie.
“I recognize that there is some chance however minute it might be that among the confidence tricksters and madmen are some genuine prophets and angels. But I judge the likelihood as being negligible in practice.”
I see no basis upon which to form a judgement regarding probabilities on such matters. It is beyond my ken.
It is beyond your ken because you will not accept that absence of evidence is evidence of absence! All the evidence here is that human beings who claim to be prophets or angels are confidence tricksters or madmen, and there is no evidence that any of them are actually prophets or angels. That seems a reasonable basis for skepticism about such claims. It is the same argument as that used by the Christian God, or son of God when he said it was easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. It is a negligible probability.
“You refuse to do this on the grounds of some form of philosophical purity.”
Quite right too!
“Let us take all of your philosophical caveats for granted. Will you then offer an opinion based on the best evidence there is?”
I have already stated my opinion. But, in summary, my opinion, based on my experience of the some Christians that I have met, some of them are bad people and hypocrites, some of them are lazy, stupid, and need to learn how to think for themselves, some of them are insane, and some of them are decent people who simply believe something that I do not. I don’t know whether their beliefs are based in reality. From my reading and reflection, it is my considered opinion that they are mistaken in their beliefs. All I know is that I do not believe them nor have any reason to do so. I am not a Christian nor do I intend to become one. I think that Jesus existed but was a human being (perhaps a wise one—if something of his words are preserved in the New Testament) who was conspired against and murdered. I think that he died on the cross and that was the end of him. His resurrection was a lie. But that is simply my opinion.
You make it sound as if an opinion based on good evidence is a lesser form of knowledge. Most of what we know are opinions, albeit offered with different levels of certainty. Probably only believers like the Christians will say they know something with certainty. That is their delusion. All I was trying to get you to do was to abandon futile gestures such as saying this ‘might’be so and that ‘might’be so when all reason suggests that the might is merely a hedge to save face in case it were not so.
“Now while you are convincing me that there are metaphysical assumptions behind science, I am not convinced that any other form of enquiry has no similar assumptions, or less significant ones.”
I agree with you (I think)—I would like to know a little more about what you mean. To some extent all forms of enquiry must presume something about the object of enquiry in order to present a methodology—often these presumptions take the form of categories and definitions, or distinctions, which often cannot be tested by experience (in an objective sence, rather than a pragmatic sense). Often the criteria of success is simply whether a form of enquiry is proving to be useful, interesting, or fruitful. However, even if physics is based on metaphysical assumptions that limit and direct its modes of enquiry, as I argue it is, (in many respects these assumptions simply define the discipline and its mode), pre-empting what qualifies as natural and an experiment, this does not imply that it lacks rigor, empirical scrutiny, technical excellence, and logic. Physics requires many intellectual virtues to do it properly. I’m sure that chemistry and the other sciences do too. Science requires many intellectual virtues and does have something of a profound spirit of adventure to it. There seems many criteria under which we can choose between good and bad forms of enquiry, even if we are unable to verify or falsify their assumptions, because of the way that they are undertaken. The problem with theology, in contrast, is that it became quite dull, pointless, and, ultimately, distilled down to a catalogue of assorted opinions, arguments, and authorities. No doubt, at its best, theology is profoundly rigorous and scholarly, but modern physics was simply more exciting and fruitful. Moreover, the early physicists wrote in modern languages (as well as latin) and, hence, as well as providing interesting machines, with novel and exciting powers, they were more accessible to a wider class of educated people (who could read Italian, French, English, etc, but not Latin or Greek)—of the lesser merchant classes—and thus was simply more widely available to explore. It seems to me that there really is a strong case for the argument that scholarly dialectics and Aristotle’s physics were never disproven, but simply became widely perceived as irrelevant. On the other hand, the new sciences (including medicine as well as physics and chemistry) were showing themselves to be very exciting indeed.
I welcome this statement, although I am not sure about Aristotle’s physics.
“The work of science is what it does in the real world. It allows us, or scientists believe it allows us, to learn about it and, all right, it allows us to make machines that demonstrate what we have learnt, that do what we wanted them to do, and so we can then use these ‘machines’to explain how Nature does this or that…”
My view, is that experimental physics teaches us about one way—a pretty powerful way at that—that we can intervene and interact within the world. Note that I said within - rather than with. However, this is the whole world, including the social and natural, and when we try to objectify the knowledge that we abstract from our models of machine performances then we start to hit deep philosophical problems. Of course science does something real. I don’t deny that. What I question is whether we can objectively know what it is that we are doing and have done when we experiment using machines. As I argue in my book, we can’t, not at present anyway, and thus the whole project of experimental physics is experimental. This is unavoidable because of the way that physics ‘tests’its models by further implementing them in technological innovation. Which requires further modelling and testing, and so on…. that is why I argue for a coherence theory of science rather than a correspondence theory. Personally, I think that music is a better analogy for physics than religion is. However, it is the realist claim for correspondence that differentiates physics from music. Music lacks any metaphysical foundation (but, metaphysics would be required if we tried to postulate and explain musical creativity). My argument is that experimental physics needs mechanical realism in order to make the claims for correspondence of its theories to an objective reality that pre-exists the efforts of physicists and is independent from what may or may not be thought, believed, or known about it. Whilst physics can produce very useful, interesting, and coherent work (from a pragmatic point of view) its successes do not prove correspondence.
I think you are right in much of what you say here but we differ mainly on attitude—is the pint of cider half full or half empty?—effectively. We are making assumptions in doing science and I rejoice that we seem to be learning so much that is of practical value in understanding the world, whereas you seem to view the scientific ‘experiment’ much more negatively. I accept the word ‘experiment’and that is why I think we have to progress cautiously. I am more scared of doing some things than some scientists—often speaking where the money is, for their bosses—such as GM and nuclear power until problems are resolved. My fears over these things are precisely because I believe in correspondence, and I suspect you do too, when it comes to the possibility of poisoning the world either now or in the future with radioactive waste, or releasing triffids into the natural environment.
“…osmosis for example explains many things in living systems, and tests show it obeys the same rules as osmosis and reverse osmosis used in devices.”
The fact that a natural process can be described in the same way as an artificial process, apparently obeying the same rules, presupposes that there is only one way that something can be done. This is a metaphysical presupposition. It remains empirically possible that there could be at least two ways that osmosis could occur—two distinct sequences of causes leading to the same effect—and whilst it is possible to reproduce the results of natural processes by using artifice it does not necessarily follow that one knows the causes of nature. There could even be several different ways to produce osmosis artifically. This is why I focus on the distinction between techne and episteme in my book, and how experimental physics requires this distinction to be dissolved. Of course, one invokes things such as principles of simplicity or an economy of nature, of whathaveyou, but these are themselves metaphysical presuppositions and precepts that cannot be proven on the basis of experience.
We disagree again because I think that as long as correspondence works the suppositions of science are being upheld. In science we cannot prove anything by experiment, as you have said before, because all possible circumstances cannot be tested, but so long as the experiment has a possible outcome that contradicts the hypothesis it is testing, but does not do so, the experiment is scientifically valid and the hypothesis is upheld. If science is an experiment then it might eventually fail, and maybe it is doing with the violation of Bell’s inequality. We shall then find the limits of science, just as we found the limits of Newton’s laws.
“I agree that it would be desirable to change the aims that science is predominantly used for in society, and it would be great if more scientists decided to play a part in deciding what they are being used for. If they are to do so, though, they need to be won over, not derided as sickening.”
I agree.
“Without having the figures to hand, it seems that the Education Act of 1870 had a profound effect on the religious beliefs of the Brits because they had things, not just science, explained to them in the primary schools after that. We were not plagued, as the USA is, by a lot of fundamentalists determined to turn the clock back, and the result is that only one in twenty, if that, attend church these days. The USA would have gone the same way quite probably if it had not been for the fundies reorganising after the Scopes trial to re-impose Christian mythology.”
It is arguable that the UK is simply maturer society that the US, due to being older if nothing else. But I think that it is deeper than this. I also think that the actions of the fundamentalists in the USA are going to be disasterous for the USA (as well as the rest of the world). But I think that the retrograde motion of the USA towards religious fundamentalism and against secular science is a symptom of social decay rather than a cause. I think that the right wing neocons are basically destroying the democratic institutions and economy of the USA and, especially when the oil has run out, the USA is going to collapse into dark and ignorant anarchy. Especially if they destroy the scientific base of the country. I think that we are seeing plunderers at work and the whole religious and moral crusade is a smokescreen.
Nothing to disagree on here!
“When science is fairly explained, it is undoubtedly compelling because it seems to be excellent at explaining what we observe around us, machines certainly but natural things too.”
It did me the power of good intellectually—And I became sceptical about science by studying physics not by studying philosophy or religion.
“People are gullible and even foolish for accepting unquestioningly what their priests and pastors tell them, but an aim of a liberal education is to improve people’s critical faculties.”
I agree.
“Religiously indoctrinated people can benefit more than others from it. A liberal thinker like you must favour that, surely.”
I do.
“I was thinking of the USA as the leading western society when you said ‘we’live in a technological society, because it is the most advanced of our societies, but is hardly post-Christian without needing any retrogression, and so hardly ready for a higher level of maturity.”
Like most societies, the USA is complex and quite out of harmony with itself. I think the we are seeing the society retrograde back into a religious stage. It always was a Christian country, as are all of the European countries, but I think that it is now destroying itself as a democratic, scientific country.
“I agree that we have a poor basis of philosophy in out educational system, but my guess is that it has never been any good in the state schools, and only had any basis in the public schools.”
I think that it needs to be introduced in quite a soft and light way in schools—not at all academic—and, when it is part of a science degree, philosophy should be an option, rather than compulsory. I think that a broad study of history and politics should be a compulsory part of everyone’s education—with students encouraged to be philosophical, but on their own terms and at their own pace.
The trouble is that the free school idea only works when the pupils are motivated to study in the first place. Many British schools have been chaotic for years because most pupils will not learn, and the people who suffer most are the ones who do want to learn something. We have twenty years of immaturity so that we can fill our craniums with knowledge that will be useful in life. To do it, we all, kids included, need to recognize that they are obliged to be taught for their own good as well as society’s. And, if they are to go at their own pace, which is plainly desirable, teachers must have the time to deal with pupils who are all going at different rates. It will need individual tuition to work properly. Otherwise the kids will have to be streamed with the problems associated with that, particularly of categorizing kids in the slow streams as failures. I cannot see why science and philosophy cannot be introduced at school with courses in problem solving. Kids do problems as an entertainment, so they should not even regard it as a learning chore, if it is introduced well.
“I would have benefitted from a philosophical introduction to science but had to grope around to try to get it by reading Russell’s History of Western Philosophy that, no doubt will have added to my positivist indoctrination, and some individual books that seemed relevant like Descartes’ Discourse on Method.”
I hated Russell’s HWP when I read it. Largely on the basis of his awful essay on Nietzche. I used it to wipe up one of my girlfriend’s vomit one night. You wanted to know that. His essay In Praise of Idleness is a good essay. I liked Descartes’ DoM very much, even though I didn’t agree with it at all. I just like the way that he lays down his ideas—I like his style rather than his methods and conclusions.
It is a funny use of Russell’s book, I agree, though I would not have used it in the same situation. I couldn’t afford to. In my case the girl would wake up in the night with a bleary, ‘What you doing?’to find me cleaning up my own vomit! But I liked Russell, and still do, partly for the reason you liked Descartes. Russell is usually a clear writer, though no one could expect such a broad book to do justice to every philosopher in the western world.
“I did not get much out of them, and that is not a criticism of philosophy, but because I had fat tomes on maths, physics, and physical, organic and inorganic chemistry to read, and could never therefore concentrate adequately on such peripheral books without feeling that my time would be better used reading the books I would be examined on. I suppose the truth is that not everyone can be taught philosophy in any depth, but at the least each of us should get a philosophical introduction to our own chosen subject.”
I would have hated university philosophy when I was a physics student—I would have considered it to have been waffle and a complete waste of time—mathematics and experiment was the only way forward for me in those days. I had to come to my own understanding in my own way before I was ready for a study of philosophy.
I never came to it!
“I agree about the expenditure of money on science, but that is not a criticism of science. Vast amounts seem to be spent on prestigious mega-projects or feeding failed approaches whose exponents keep pleading that the breakthrough is imminent, but it turns out to be like the Parousia. Redirecting tranches of this money would be helpful for the face of science, but scientists have little say in it. If they sought funds for less fashionable but practical approaches, they would probably fail, and the money would go to a present rival. Rich men’s dolars and our taxes are directed where the rich men think they will make more money, and where governments think they can buy financial leverage. Technicians at their benches have no say in it, and that is what I think ought to be changed, among other things. Scientists should have a say, but first they have got to want it.”
I agree. And I really think that lots of ‘small science’projects over a few ‘big science’projects is the best way to hit breakthroughs. It seems to me that decision about how tax payers’ money should be spent should be a matter between scientists and the demos—we need to pull the professional politicians and civil servants out of the loop, provide a good general education in the sciences and humanities, and I think that the general public will be more than capable of judging the proposals and arguments presented by scientists. Although a simpler way of doing it would be to elect scientists onto public forums to decide the direction of science funding. Of course, business is going to fund what they see as profitable to the shareholders, rather than humanity in general, and it should be left up to them how they spend their money, but this is why democratic governments cannot leave the directions of science in the hands of business and the market. Let business do its own scientific research, within the law, but most science in general should be funded by the state and chosen through democratic means.
The trouble is that democracy is a sham. The demos has no power. We are ruled. Marx was right. Despite all the media propaganda, we have a ruling class and they are the ones who employ us all, scientists included. We would need a revolution and the institution of some proper form of democracy for us to by pass politicians and corporate bosses and tell the scientists directly what we want them to do. What can unite us all is the appreciation that we face a common enemy. It is environmental destruction. The bloodymindedness of Bush and the oil barons he stands for shows it is no easy task, even then.
“Well, even in our own discussions I was surprised how readily you took to defending religion when it was not necessary, and I did not expect it. Because I see religion as almost a diametric opposite to science in its basic approaches and attitudes, it was inevitable that I would continue to feature these contrasts in my discussions with you, but I rather expected you to brush me off mainly with a cursory or conditional agreement, or disagreement perhaps, and stick to the science.”
Okay. But I think that it might be clearer by now that I was kind of defending my own liberalism, which I know most fundamentalists hate. But I’m one of those strange liberals who think that Nazis should be allowed to publish their filth in the spirit of political freedom that they would deny others. We then counter them with reason, evidence, and discussion to show them, point after point, after point, why we have better ideas. I think that to beat the fanatic you have to be morally better than them, not by being better at being like them.
Again, it is fine in the best of all worlds, but I remain a realist even while holding generally liberal views. Fascism is like a lobster pot. You can get in but you cannot get out alive.
“But I have enjoyed what you are saying.”
For the most part, I have enjoyed these emails very much. I actually look forward to them and feel a little disappointed when opening my inbox and seeing that you haven’t got round to sending a reply yet. I am enjoying reading your pages too—but, apart from your essay on the Nazis and Christianity as well as a couple on science—I have pretty much stuck to reading the e-pistles, which I have enjoyed. I have to be quite disciplined with my reading time—focussing on my own researches into science (I think that our current exchange is, ironically, the longest discussion on religion that I have in about twenty years)—and, given that I have read your books, I feel that I don’t really need to read the pages before making comments (unlike some of your ‘fans’who don’t seem to think that they need to read your ideas at all before criticising them). But, having said that, I will read some more of your writings in the future.
“As for putting it all on the web, it is because it seemed so useful in the context of my pages from both vantage points—science and Christianity—that I suggested putting them on line, but it is not mainly what you are saying here that I am speaking of. I have already said that the fundies will use what you say wherever it is because they will see you as an ally in their fight against science. They do not have to understand you, or fully agree with you, because these people are unscrupulous. They will just use your unqualified conclusions because they suit their argument. If there was something beneficial at the end of it then they could be refuted. That is why I say you seem to have nothing constructive to offer. But then I have not yet finished what you do have to say.”
I kind of see what you mean, but I feel that once I start letting these people indirectly influence my right to expression then I am letting them censor me. That I will not do. So, sorry, but I’m going to say what I think and to hell with them. But, I really don’t think that they will get all that much leverage from me—they’ll find me much too woolly and weird for their purposes. Their best chance against science is to take the moral high ground and your best defence against them is to deny them it. Which is exactly what you are doing. Even in my terms, science’s best ally is its actually the machine prototypes that it produces. A bottle of antibiotics from a pharmacy makes a far better defence of science than any argument from a philosopher or historian. I think that the implication about my argument that you have missed is that my criticisms of physics draw the defenders of physics into defending the technological society—it is on the question of the goodness of the technological society and the value of science that you will have the fundamentalists well and truly on the ropes. Given the choice between living in a fundamentalist theocracy or a scientific technocracy most modern people, even if they are religious too, will choose the latter over the former. My equation of scientific truth with technological power may at first sight seem to have critical value for the antiscience movement, but, once we start to think about it then most people will readily affirm modern science on the basis of its technological power. As a friend of mine points out, he is an antirealist about science until he talks to me. Then he finds himself being a realist about science. I’m not saying that I’m trying to trick people in being scientific realists through some strange antirealist polemic. But, I do hold that I have really probed some fundamental assumptions of modern science and technology to the extent that my book really will clarify them for people who live in technological societies and have the patience to read my book. Of course this will lead to criticism of science (well, I hope so anyway) but that can only be good for science—and it will certainly not help the antiscience Christian fundamentalists. If they had their way then most women would die before they were twenty five during childbirth and most men would die of boredom.
I am a scientific realist that is not enamoured of the technological society but think we have to step back from the gross exploitation of the planet corporations are indulging in to a more organic and natural position if we are to survive, but I see the scientific method as the way that we can learn how to live organically without destroying the world. If that means a new concept of science not based on machines, then I am not bothered about it, but the basic method of observation, hypothesis, deduction, testing, observation which constitutes the scientific method is the way we can find out how to live best with the rest of the world’s life forms without driving them to extinction. It seems that some medic at Sheffield university (I think) is warning us that a third of British couples will be having fertility problems in only a few years’ time. He wants to start some programme to stop this ‘disease’. I fear it is not a disease at all but the immune system of the Goddess Nature finding ways of combatting the odious parasite that has gone out of control in her biosphere.
“I missed out known knowledge, but your not knowing what it could be is the point. It sounds like nonsense. ‘Epistemic’sounds redundant, and, though I realise it is not, I did not know what to make of it, until you just explained it referred to causes. You sound indignant that I did not, but my first resource when I thought it necessary to check what I understood of these things was your own book. You do indeed have an explanatory section in which a selection of words in Greek and a few in other languages are raised, but I could not find these among them because they are not there. Contrary to what you say, ‘alethic’does not appear until page 140 where it is used in the expression ‘alethic modalities’, while ‘epistemic’does appear on page 42 but simply used in the Bhaskar quotation ‘an epistemic fallacy’. ‘Epistemic knowledge’is used on page 72 again in connexion with Bhaskar but its use is assumed not explained. You do mention ‘aletheia’as meaning ‘truth’specifically as a mode of disclosure for Heidegger on page 24, distinguishing it from truth as ‘correctness’for which ‘veritas’was apparently the preferred word. None of this matters in a book meant for people who already know what all these foreign words used as technical jargon actually mean, namely your fellow philosophers, but in a book meant also for general readers, including me, it matters.”
Prior to page 42, when I introduced Bhaskar’s idea of an ‘epistemic fallacy’, the meaning of the word episteme and its relation to modern science has been clearly defined (perhaps, not clearly enough). The adjective ‘epistemic’simply means pertaining to episteme. I introduced and defined the word episteme on page 24 as being commonly translated as science or knowledge of eternal and necessary principles before spending the next five pages discussing how it related to techne (defined as the knowledge of the causes at work during acts of making). I provided all the references for how these kinds of knowledge were defined and related in Plato and Aristotle. On pages 30 to 32 I discuss how both of these kinds of knowledge relate to experimental physics and how I will use them throughout the book. On page 41 I explicitly state that scientific realism aims to achieve episteme as defined as the knowledge of eternal and necessary principles. This is placed in the context of knowledge of natural causes and its centrality to the experimentation—something that is the main subject of the whole of chapter 2. In chapter 3 I also made it clear how physics operates by conflating episteme and techne as two distinct types of knowledge, thus more than suggesting that there is more than one type of knowledge. The word aletheia is introduced in chapter 1, on page 24, as you noted, in the context of Heidegger’s essay The Question Concerning Technology and the important distinction between truth in its original meaning and that of truth of correctness from the Latin derivation (veritas). I also discussed it on page 32. Here aletheia is specifically defined as meaning truth as a being bound together with modes of discloure that bring forth the truth. This is related to technology and metaphysics, but here I limit my discussion to this in the context of Heidegger’s conception of modern technology and its distinction from ancient handicrafts. However, there was quite a lot of work for me to do before exploring this notion of truth in relation to experimental physics and discovery. I discuss this relation at the end of the book. Before discussing this relation I needed to show how experimental physics does not actually reach its goal of achieving idealised forms of knowledge, such as episteme and techne, but instead produces knowledge of alethic modalities. Again the adjective ‘alethic’suggests that such knowledge pertains to aletheia, but, in the book, I specifically defined this knowledge in terms of the modern meaning of alethic modality (pertaining to the qualification of something as being possible, impossible, probable, improbable, necessary, arbitrary, etc.) This definition is exactly the same as can be found in a common English dictionary, as well as any philosophical dictionary, several of which are to be found free of charge on the Internet. Of course the term ‘known knowlege’is nonsensical. It would be akin to saying black blackness or subtle subtlety. I believe that the name for this is a pleonasm. It is a logical impossibility to have unknown knowledge—or false knowledge for that matter. If it can be shown that one claimed knowledge which latter was shown to be false then it is arguable that one was mistaken in the prior claim to have knowledge is the first instance.
Well, I pointed out that alethic was not defined as you claimed—and it was not, as such—simply because of your high handed manner about the meaning of these words which you use as part of a technical jargon which is far from familiar to most people. I noted in my reply that you had a section explaining terms in your book, but the specific adjectives we are speaking about do not appear even though their nouns do. My central point was about what we understand by these words, and that philosophers like to redefine them to suit themselves. It means an effort has to be made to forget the meaning normally understood, and plainly I have not made enough of an effort on a first reading such as you people of X-ray intellect obviously expect.
I didn’t mean to sound indignant—I think that a little exasperated and disappointed was closer to the truth—but you did say
“As for your distinction between alethic and epistemic knowledge, I still have not got it, perhaps because I cannot avoid thinking that “alethic” pertains to truth and “epistemic” pertains to knowledge and so you are talking about a distinction between true knowledge and knowable knowledge or knowing knowledge. It highlights a problem with philosophy for we unphilosophical mortals, and that it that much of it ends up, as I said before, as hapless conjecture in which words are invented or redefined to suit the arguments of the philosopher. Quite how that differs in principle from what you are criticizing about science, namely forcing it into a square shaped box then declaring it to be square, I cannot see.”
Not only is this a little obtuse and based on a misunderstanding of my book, but it seems that the problem for you ‘unphilosophical mortals’, as you put it, is one of being too quick to believe that you’ve understood something, and dismiss it as either circular or nonsensical, when infact you haven’t even read it carefully enough to find the definition of key terms in the first chapter. Let alone taking the trouble to reach for a dictionary. There are many types of knowledge (episteme, techne, sophia, nous, phronesis) that are oft discussed in philosophy, and I was introducing the idea of alethic knowledge as being that achieved through experiment. I certainly was not suggesting that alethic knowledge was the only type—in fact, the whole thrust of my criticism of the scientific realist interpretation of physics is that their claim that epistemic knowledge produced through experiment is the only knowledge. Whereas I argue that physics does not achieve such knowledge but rather achieves a much more modest alethic knowledge. I base this claim on several well documented examples from real physics, as well as my own experiences as a doctoral student of experimental physics at CERN, my own experiences of other laboratory work in other branches of physics, as well as the historical and philosophical work of others (all referenced in the book), so I do not feel that ‘hapless conjecture’really does my work all that much justice, especially when it is pretty evident from your comments that you were unclear what it was that I was happlessly conjecturing about. And, I’m afraid to say that, your comment that I had just invented or redefined these words to suit my argument merely shows your ignorance rather than any sophistry on my part. That is why I suggested that you should check out some of these free online philosophical dictionaries.
Since you invited me to reach for a dictionary, I did and find that the ones I used do not give the definitions that you have for some of these words, even when they are defined. The OED refers it (episteme) to the Greek for knowledge, adding ‘degree of acceptance’, and the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (OCTP) has it as pertaining to what is ‘rationally worthy of belief’. This definition is obviously the one that scientists accept. You chose to say that experimental knowledge is alethic knowledge and this is not true knowledge, as it seems to be from the words, but less than true knowledge because it is qualified in some way that I will discover when I read the book. All I am saying here is that the jargon you use is not user friendly in the sense that its meaning leaps at you from the words you use. Continuing to do what you urged me to do, I looked up the meanings of the words you list in Honderich’s OCTP to find that nousic knowledge and phronetic knowledge might even be better terms for what you are distinguishing because nous refers to a rationality capable of grasping the fundamentals of reality while phronesis refers to the practical intellect. Anyway, the only seed of life this discussion has is that, notwithstanding your explanatory section, a book like yours that uses a vocabulary replete with jargon ought to have a glossary in which your own definitions of these words are given rather than leaving it to the reader to check them by re-reading your text or using an external reference that might merely add to the reader’s confusion.
“Maybe, but argument in philosophy often seems to be to define the meaning of words in such a way that the subject appears to be square, then saying it is (QED).”
Really? And which works of philosophy were you refering to? Apart from mine that is.
Why won’t yours do? Another of your heroes, Heidegger, has dasein, das sein and das seiende, all of which seem to mean being—but apparently not existence—but in such subtly different ways that ambiguity becomes profundity. Define observations as theory laden with Feyerabend and Kuhn and suddenly science cannot work because different theoretical explanations are not commensurable. On the other hand, deconstruction in which the text defies the author is indefinable according to its inventor. I did say ‘often’ in the sentence you cited, so I am not accusing all philosophers of it. How can I? I am not a philosopher, perhaps because I have the bad habit of trying to use words with their common interpretation.
“I am not dismissing it out of hand. I am trying to understand not just what you are saying about physics but what it implies for science as a whole. You conclude that science needs to be scrutinized by philosophers, and there can be nothing wrong with that in any tolerant liberal society, bearing in mind that we ought to know ourselves before we can know others.”
Agreed.
“Regrettably, even though our society is more tolerant than most known in history, it has huge hosts of intolerant and illiberal people who think they know other people better than they know themselves.”
Unfortunately, this is all too true.
“Moreover, ‘we cannot separate the being for which knowledge is intelligible from the way that knowledge is produced, without making that knowledge completely unintelligible as knowledge’, seems to be perfectly general, and so is a criticism of all knowledge.”
No, it is not. It is a criticism of the idea that we can abstract knowledge from the lived context of production in which it was meaningful. It is specifically a criticism of scientific realism.
Why does it not apply to knowledge produced in some other way than scientific realism, say revelation? Or say, Platonism, or Aristotelianism, or Feyerabendism, or Derridaism, or even Rogersism? All knowledge that is passed from its originator to others is separated from the way it was produced and so must be unintelligible, according to this precept.
“The same with anything that is ‘a way of understanding that is dependent on the presumption that it is good for us to understand the world in this way’. And again until we have absolute knowledge ourselves and become gods, what we have is ‘perpetually innovated and its truth-status is perpetually deferred to some future state of completion and perfection’. So, while you have a point about the mechanical nature of experimental physics, much of your criticism is general.”
Well, much of my criticisms are generalisable to scientific realist and positivist epistemologies of experimental sciences, in as much as those epistemologies are based on their interpretation of physics and truth. Physics is represented as the model exact science which all other sciences (including social sciences) supposedly are to imitate. Where any science (or other form of knowledge aquisition) does not imitate physics then my criticisms simply do not apply.
Yet they seem to be expressed as if they were general principles. If “physics is only a way of understanding that is dependent on the presumption that it is good for us to understand the world in this way’, what form of knowledge is not dependent on this presumption? Even theologians have now decided that theology is corrigible, having discovered that to pretend it is revealing fixed and eternal truths leaves religionist open to ridicule, and so that too is deferred to some future state of perfection—heaven, no doubt.
“It is a critique of getting knowledge at all.”
Only if you reduce knowledge to being that produced by the mechanistic ‘natural’ sciences.
Revelation and theology cannot be thus reduced, nor the work of all of those philosophers. Rogersism is a way of understanding that is bad for us? One case, at least, is anecdotal evidence that in Rogersism “we cannot separate the being for which knowledge is intelligible from the way that knowledge is produced, without making that knowledge completely unintelligible as knowledge’, though that case can be explained in other ways such as poor reading and comprehension through neglecting to hone the philosophic X-ray intellect.
“If these are characteristics of alethic knowledge then human knowledge is necessarily alethic, in your sense of it.”
Putting aside the fact that I am a little dubious as to whether you have my sense of it, I make no such claim that all human knowledge is necessarily alethic—my arguments are limited to the case of experimental physics, but, as well as other crafts and music, I suggest that they can be extended to other experimental sciences, such as genetics, chemistry, and biochemistry, but this requires more argumentation then provided in my book, On The Metaphysics Of Experimental Physics. I shall raise this in my next book Modern Science and The Capriciousness Of Nature—in which I shall make more general claims (as well as noting problems with generalisations between different sciences). Even if my claims do extend to all other experimental and nature sciences, then they do not by implication necessarily extend to the observational and interpretive natural sciences, such as behavioural biology, evolutionary biology, geology, astronomy, meteorology, etc., except where such sciences import knowledge from the experimental sciences. But that would be another book in its own right. And even if my claims extended to all science (which I suggest that they do not) then it would still require considerably more work than any one person could do to show that only scientific knowledge was knowledge and thus the only knowledge that a human being could have was alethic. For example, I think that much of mathematical knowledge is logical rather than empirical and it cannot be tested by experimentation. It is knowledge on the basis of mathematical proof alone. However, as such, it only informs us about mathematics and says nothing about natural principles. And there are many other types of knowledge as well, but these would not be considered scientific because they are not abstracted from alethic modalities.
I know you are not making the claim that all human knowledge is alethic. I said that if the features that I picked out from what you wrote were features of the alethic character of knowledge, then they seem to be more general than just experimental science. As for mathematics, the whole vast bulk that it now comprises began with direct experience of counting sheep and goats, measuring volumes of wheat and the size of plots of land, and eventually the weights of precious metals. From these actions came arithmetic and geometry, and once these had started it logic continued it. But since mathematics describes the machines that you consider simply artefacts as well as many natural phenomena like population dynamics, growth spirals and myriads of other natural phenomena, it seems less obtuse to me to consider that the mathematics represent some sort of reality behind the snapshot pictures we call experiments and observations.
